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MILITARY CASES
down in the past as unreasonable.4 6 Hopefully, the Court will main-
tain a vigilant eye on the ever increasing power of organized labor
and not lose sight of the invaluable rights granted the individual
worker in section 7.
THOMAS C. LIBER
HABEAS CORPUS - EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES -
MILITARY CASES
Noyd v. Bond, 402 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1969)
(No. 830).
The United States Supreme Court has not decided a military
habeas corpus case for over 10 years.' During this period the
lower federal courts have faced the problem of subordinating the
military to civilian control by balancing the interests of military
effectiveness against the affirmitive value of keeping military power
in check. In weighing these interests, federal courts have applied
the concept of exhaustion of military remedies.2 The doctrine is
directed toward minimizing the potential conflict between the ci-
vilian and the military courts by permitting each to function in its
appropriate sphere. The recent case of Noyd v. Bond' illustrates
that the application of this concept dissolves into no simple for-
mula.
In Noyd a general court-martial tried the accused, found him
guilty of willfully disobeying a command,4 and sentenced him to 1
year of confinement at hard labor. Pending military review on
appeal,' Noyd's commanding officer, General Bond, ordered him
to be transferred from Canon Air Force Base to the United States
Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Noyd sought
habeas corpus in the federal district court and challenged the order
as an execution of a sentence prior to final military review, pro-
hibited by article 71 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.6 He
further alleged that he could not be restrained at Fort Canon more
rigorously than was required to insure his presence on appeal.7
United States ...." Id. The union's failure to proceed under a section 301 action may
indicate that neither party regarded the ceiling as a term of the employment contract.
4 6 See, e.g., Printz Leather Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1312 (1951) (Board found an unfair
labor practice by union and employer where an employee was discharged for violation
of a union rule limiting production).
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The district court found that the military authorities had ex-
ceeded their statutory mandate by transferring Noyd to Fort Leav-
enworth and held the order void.8  The court declined, however, to
inquire into the degree of restraint the military could impose upon
Noyd at Fort Canon. The court justified this result by reasoning
that because the military possessed the power to restrain Noyd at
Fort Canon,9 the question of the proper exercise of this power was
more properly committed to military determination.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found
that the district court should not have reviewed either issue because
Noyd had failed to exhaust his military remedies. Although Noyd
was not making a collateral attack upon a court-martial proceed-
ing,'" the court stated that he could obtain relief by resort to the
proper military tribunal." The court further stated that the proper
1 Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S. 583 (1957); Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569
(1957). In neither case did the Court attempt to clarify the problems left unresolved
in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953) (separate
opinion). Cf. note 21 infra & accompanying text.
2The exhaustion concept is premised upon the belief that all available remedies
provided by law should be pursued prior to using the extraordinary remedy of habeas
corpus. See Snedeker, Habeas Corpus and Court-Martial Prisoners, 6 VAND. L. REV.
288, 292 (1953). Thus, in the military context this simply means that one is nor-
mally required to avail himself of the remedies provided within the military structure
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) prior to bringing habeas cor-
pus in the federal courts.
3402 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Jan. 21,
1969) (No. 830).
4 Article 90 (2) of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 890(2) (1964), provides punishment
by court-martial for willfully disobeying a command.
r Appellate review of court-martial convictions by a military board of review is
provided in article 66 of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964).
6 U.C.M.J. art. 71(c), 10 U.S.C. § 871(c) (1964).
7 Noyd argued that due process of law under the fifth amendment as applied to the
military required that the military justify the necessity to restrain him at Fort Canon
pending his appeal. Brief for Appellant, at 37-41, Noyd v. Bond, 402 F.2d 441 (10th
Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1969) (No. 830).
8 Noyd v. Bond, 285 F. Supp. 785 (D.N.M. 1968).
9 Article 36 of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1964), gives the President the power
to prescribe rules for the military courts. He has promulgated the Manual for Courts-
Martial. Exec. Order No. 10,214, 3 C.F.R. 408 (Comp. 1949-1953) [hereinafter cited
as Manual]. Pursuant to the Manual the commanding officer has the power to "take
prompt and appropriate action with respect to the restraint of the person tried." Man-
ual 5 2 1(d).
'0 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has clearly required exhaustion of
all military remedies when an attack on a court-martial conviction is lodged in the
federal courts. See, e.g., Gorko v. Commanding Officer, 314 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1963).
However, Noyd was not collaterally attacking his conviction by a general court-martial,
but was challenging the legality of an order of his commanding officer which would
restrain him at Fort Levenworth.
11 The district court, never specifically identifying Noyd's available military rem-
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utilization of review procedures would include a writ of habeas
corpus to the Court of Military Appeals. 2
Federal courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction to review mili-
tary cases' 3 and they have exercised this jurisdiction not only to
circumscribe the nature of the power delegated by Congress under
article I of the Constitution,'" but also to restrain the military from
exceeding the scope of its delegated power. 5 In the latter situa-
tion, they have distinguished circumstances in which the military
exceeds the grant of power delegated by Congress from those in
which power properly vested in the military is challenged as being
improperly exercised.' 6 As a matter of judicial self-restraint, the
edies, simply reasoned that because Noyd would have served his entire sentence prior to
exhausting his remedies, failure to exhaust inadequate remedies did not preclude re-
view by a civilian court. Noyd v. Bond, 285 F. Supp. 785, 788 (D..M 1968). In
Levy v. Dillon, 286 F. Supp. 593 (D. Kan. 1968), the court held that under article 138
of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1964), any member of the armed forces may com-
plain to a superior officer if he believes himself wronged by his commanding officer.
Levy v. Dillon, supra at 595. However, competent testimony as to the delay involved
in going through military channels suggests that this remedy would have been inade-
quate. Hearings on S. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of Military
Personnel of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 790 (1962). It
is clear that the U.C.M.J. has no provision for judicial review within the military of the
actions of a commanding officer, such as were challenged by Noyd in the instant case.
12 402 F.2d at 443. The court simply cited Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M_. 135, 17
C.M.R. 399 (1967), as authority for this proposition. However, the Court of Military
Appeals had developed the doctrine that it possessed habeas corpus jurisdiction in an
earlier case. Frischholz v. United States, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966).
But it is interesting to note that in Noyd the court of appeals became the first federal
court to find that the Court of Military Appeals possesses habeas corpus jurisdiction.
This holding distinguishes Noyd from the host of other military cases which the Su-
preme Court has declined to review within the last decade and suggests that the Court
may have granted certiorari in Noyd to consider this precise issue.
13 Under the Judicial Code federal courts have military habeas corpus jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964). Prior to this statute they exercised general habeas corpus
jurisdiction over the military. See, e.g., Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); Dynes v.
Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). It has been argued that the "finality provi-
sion" in article 76 of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964), precludes federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction over the military; however, this argument was rejected in Gusik v.
Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1950). See also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844, 850 (1953) (separate opinion).
Federal courts have never exercised appellate jurisdiction over the military. In re
Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (1900); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).
14United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (The Court declared
unconstitutional an act of Congress which subjected a discharged veteran to court-
marital for offenses committed in his prior service.).
15 In Sweet v. Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456 (D. Kan. 1959), the military reviewing
authority was found to have exceeded its statutory power by revising the court-martial
sentence and transferring petitioner from a federal reformatory to a penitentiary. See
Green v. Schilder, 162 F.2d 803 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 838 (1947).
16 Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902). The Court distinguished between
situations where military action was "void because of absolute want of power" and
where it was "merely voidable because of defective exercise of power possessed." Id. at
401. See also Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S. 583, 584 (1957).
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 677
courts have limited their scope of habeas corpus review 17 and have
applied the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. 8 In state cases the
Supreme Court has held that this requirement "is not one defining
power but one which relates to the appropriate exercise of power"1
and is based upon considerations of comity rather than defining the
scope of habeas corpus inquiry. ° Federal courts have recognized
the applicability of this rationale to military cases and have ap-
plied the doctrine as a rule of discretion.2 Thus, the crucial ques-
tion in military habeas corpus cases becomes whether the federal
courts, as a matter of judicial discretion, should defer to the judg-
ment of military tribunals.
It is significant that the thrust of Noyd's complaint was not
the defective exercise of military power already possessed,2 2 but that
the military order transferring him to Fort Leavenworth was void
for want of any power.2' However, alluding to the desirability of
military tribunals coping with problems peculiar to the supervision
of military personnel,2 4 the court deferred to the judgment of the
Court of Military Appeals.25  The underlying reason for denying
review, however, is the court's apparent belief that it is not the
proper function of civilian courts to adjust the rights of service-
men.26  Consequently, the court's application of the exhaustion
doctrine results in far too crude a resolution of competing policy
1 7 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). The Court reasoned that because Con-
gress had established a statutory scheme of judicial proceedings within the military, the
federal courts should not disregard these prior proceedings. Deference to the military
courts therefore requires that the scope of inquiry in a federal court should be limited
simply to whether the military fully and fairly dealt with the case rather than the cor-
rectness of the conclusions rendered. Id. at 142.
18See, e.g., Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (1968); Gorko v. Commanding
Officer, 314 F.2d 858 (10th Cit. 1963).
19 Bowen v. Johnson, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939).
20 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418 (1963). Although Fay involved state rather
than military habeas corpus, the Court recognized in formulating the exhaustion of
military remedies doctrine that the same policy was applicable to each. Gusik v.
Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131 (1950).
21 Williams v. Heritage, 323 F.2d 731, 732 (5th Cit. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
945 (1964). See Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 714 (2d Cit. 1968). Other
jurisdictions, although not rejecting this view, have not affirmitively accepted it. The
issue is therefore as unresolved as it was in 1953 when Mr. Justice Frankfurter urged
that the Court consider the question. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, rehearing
denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953) (separate opinion).
22 Noyd did, however, argue this issue in the alternative. See note 7 supra.
23 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
24 402 F.2d at 442.
25 Cf. text accompanying note 12 supra.
2 6 See 402 F.2d at 443.
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considerations and amounts to little more than a strict non-review-
ability doctrine.2 7
The essential function of exhaustion of military remedies is to
afford a remedy "much better adapted to reach justice than any
within the power of the district court" '28 and it is therefore premised
upon the assumption that the expertise of a military tribunal is
necessary for an adequate determination of the issues. But it is a
gross fiction to assume that the task of determining whether mili-
tary authorities have exceeded the scope of their delegated powers
is inherently dependent upon knowledge peculiar to military author-
ities and that a military tribunal is therefore more capable of re-
solving the issue than a civilian court. Moreover, under article
III of the Constitution the function of restraining a branch of gov-
ernment from exercising powers not delegated to it traditionally
has been judicial.2 9  The Court of Military Appeals is an article
I tribunal created by Congress to assist in the making of rules and
regulations for land and naval forces." The decision of the tenth
circuit vests priority in a legislative as distinguished from a judi-
cial tribunal to determine the breadth of the power delegated by
Congress. By mechanically applying the exhaustion concept in a
circumstance where neither military, requirements nor the need for
the specialized knowledge of a military court indicate the wisdom
of judicial abstention, the court has abdicated its duty to check the
unauthorized exercise of military power. It is difficult to fathom
the interest in military efficiency or national defense reigning so
paramount that federal courts must abdicate this responsibility.31
27 For discussion of the doctrine regarding administrative agencies, see 4 K. C.
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TRSATISE §§ 28.03, 28.16 (Supp. 1965); Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion", 82
HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
2 8 Whelchel v. McDonald, 176 F.2d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 1949), affd, 340 U.S.
122 (1950).
2 9 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803): "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say
what the law is." Id. at 177 (emphasis added). The Court has often checked the un-
authorized use of delegated power by executive officers. See, e.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358
U.S. 184 (1958); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); American School of Mag-
netic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
30 Military courts are legislative courts created by Congress under article I of the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Their jurisdiction has no connection with the
judicial power established under article III. I re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 127 (1900);
Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857). Cf. note 46 infra.
3 l Regarding the priority to be given national defense, the Court has said:
This concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end in itself, justify-
ing any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such a goal.... It
would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction
19691
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The importance that a free society attaches to civilian control of
the military3 2 should make federal courts loath to permit the ero-
sion of their power to determine whether the military has exceeded
the scope of its congressional mandate. Moreover, during the last
20 years the nature of -the military function has been transformed
from an instrument of national defense into an affirmitive tool of
diplomacy used to shape foreign policy.33 Consequently, the na-
tion's commitments to protect other sovereigns from military inter-
vention 34 have necessitated the establishment of a large standing
army " which in turn requires a selective service system capable of
routinely channeling large numbers of recruits into the military
service.36 When military power ascends to such prominence and
when it begins to significantly affect the lives of so many Amer-
icans,37 it is unsatisfactory to view the military as a separate en-
clave38 possessed with discretion so absolute that it can determine
the limits of its own power.39 Thus, the court's view of the mili-
the subversion of one of those liberties . . . which makes the defense of the
Nation worthwhile. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
3 2 James Madison warned against the military enslaving the people and emphasized
the importance of civilian control thereof. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 465 (rev. ed. 1937). More recently President
Eisenhower cautioned the nation of the need to control the military-complex. Eisen-
hower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, Jan. 17, 1961,
in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISEN-
HOWER 1960-61 at 1038 (1961).
33 See Note, Congress, The President, and The Power to Commit Forces to Combat,
81 HARv. L. REV. 1771, 1791 (1968).
34 Secretary of State Rusk testified that the United States has over 40 commitments
to protect other nations. Hearings on S. 1432 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1967).
35 Military personnel in active service numbered approximately 12 million during
World War II. Between 1947 and 1950 the number dropped to 1.5 million and, since
1950, it has numbered approximately 3 million. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES
TO 1957, at 736-37 (1960), as summarized in Note, supra note 33, at 1791 n.106.
3 6 The influence that the United States commitment to South Vietnam has had on
the Selective Service System can be observed in the draft calls which in January 1965
were 5400 per month and by December 1965 had increased to 40,200 per month.
1966 DIR SEL. SERV. ANN. REP. 86.
37 Mr. Chief Justice Warren has stated that active military service occupies a mini-
mum of 4 percent of the adult male's life and that reserve obligations may extend over
10 percent of his adult life. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 183, 187-88 (1962).
38 Chief Justice Quinn of the Court of Military Appeals, rejecting the concept of
military separateness, stated that "the points of contact between the civilian commu-
nity and the Armed Forces are today so numerous and intimate that it can be truly said
that military life is an immediate and integral part of American life." Quinn, The
United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process, 35 ST. JOHN'S L
REV. 225, 254 (1961).
39 Particularly in times of military confrontation does the history of American mili-
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tary as an isolated system beyond the legitimate concern of civilian
courts results in an exceedingly narrow standard for civilian control
of the burgeoning military power.
Suppose, however, that the court in Noyd had correctly applied
the exhaustion rationale: Is there a remedy of habeas corpus to the
Court of Military Appeals? That court has held that under the
All Writs Act it has habeas corpus jurisdiction over the military.4"
The language employed by Congress, however, suggests that the
Act was not intended to apply to article I courts.41 The Court of
Military Appeals has suggested that even if the Act is interpreted to
apply only to article III courts, the reasoning in Glidden Co. v.
tary justice suggest that the danger of the military exceeding its mandate is at its great-
est and that federal courts should therefore exercise an even greater resolve to guard
against attempts to expand the military power. See Bishop, Civilian Judges and Mili-
tary Justice: Collateral Review of Court-Martial Convictions, 61 COLUM. . REv. 40,
60-61 (1961). Cf. Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 761 (1944); Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823 (D. Kan. 1947). But cf. Henry
v. Hodges, 171 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 968 (1949).
4 0 Fxischholz v. United States, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966). See
Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967). The All Writs Act pro-
vides in part: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agree-
able to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (1964).
4 1 The Court of Military Appeals, however, has argued that because Congress speaks
both of "courts of the United States" and "courts established by an Act of Congress" in
Title 28, common sense compels the conclusion that Congress intended them to have
different meanings and that the latter, being more comprehensive, also includes courts
established by Congress other than those under article III. Frischholz v. United
States, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 152, 36 C.M.R. 306, 308 (1966).
Tide 28, however, creates and establishes the jurisdiction and procedure of the
lower federal courts, the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
and the courts administered by the federal government in its territorial position, and
establishes the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court The Court of Military
Appeals is created and its jurisdiction is established in article 67 of the U.C.M.J., 10
U.S.C. § 867 (1964). It is reasonable to conclude that when Congress spoke of "courts
established by an Act of Congress," since it was using such language in Tide 28, it
was referring only to courts established in that title. Furthermore, Congress has
specifically defined what it intended to include within the language "courts established
by an Act of Congress" and at least one requirement is that the judges be "entitled to
hold office during good behavior". 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1964). The judges on the
Court of Military Appeals do not satisfy this requirement because they are appointed
for 15-year terms. U.C.M.J. art 6 7(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 8 6 7(a)(1) (1964).
It is clear from section 451 of Title 28 that the Court of Claims, the Customs
Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are to be included within the
phrase "courts of the United States." Therefore, it might be argued that the Territorial
Courts, which are still considered article I courts, American Insurance Co. v. Canter,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828), and whose judges are appointed for a term of seven
years, 48 U.S.C. § 1463(a) (1964), were intended to be included within the phrase
"courts established by an Act of Congress" and that Title 28 must similarly apply to
article I courts such as the Court of Military Appeals. However, the fact that the Ter-
ritorial Courts exercise article III type jurisdiction in lieu of the presence of article III
courts distinguishes them from the Court of Military Appeals and sufficiently explains
their inclusion in Title 28.
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Zdanok,42 where both the Court of Claims and the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals were held to be article III courts, indi-
cates that because it functions in a specialized area of federal law
does not mean that it is not a part of the federal judiciary.43 The
reasoning in Glidden is inapposite to this situation because there a
divided majority emphasized that Congress had manifested its un-
ambiguous intent to treat these courts as article III tribunals.44
No similar congressional intent is gleaned through congressional
treatment of the Court of Military Appeals. 45  Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has firmly acknowledged the article I nature of the
military courts.46
Finally, habeas corpus under the All Writs Act has been ap-
plied only where an appellate court has existing jurisdiction over
a case and the writ is merely auxiliary to complete the exercise of
its jurisdiction rather than an independent and original basis for
jurisdiction.47  But the jurisdiction of the Court of Military Ap-
peals is limited to a very narrow range of cases dealing exclusively
with review of the military boards of review.48 A general power
to issue writs of habeas corpus would expand its jurisdiction to in-
42 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
43 Frischholz v. United States, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 152, 36 C.M.R. 306, 308
(1966).
44 Mr. Justice Harlan, writing the Court opinion for himself and Justices Stewart
and Brennan, viewed recent statutes clearly manifesting the congressional intent to
treat both courts as article III courts as "persuasive evidence," but did not base his opin-
ion on them. Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 542 (1962). Mr. Justice Clark, con-
curring for himself and Chief Justice Warren, viewed the statutes as being determina-
tive. Id. at 586-87. Justices Douglas and Black dissented in an opinion written by the
former. Id. at 589.
45 In fact, Congress has conferred all the indicia of an administrative tribunal upon
the Court of Military Appeals. It is located for administrative purposes in the Depart-
ment of Defense. U.C.M.I. art. 67(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(1) (1964). It is re-
quired to meet with the Judge Advocate General and to report annually to legislative
committees and executive departments. Id. § 867(g). Its judges are removable by
the President for neglect of duty or malfeasance. Id. § 867(a)(3).
46 In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), the Court said:
We find nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of military trib-
unals which entities them to rank along with Article III courts .... Unlike
courts, it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight .. . wars. ...
But trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army's
primary fighting function. Id. at 17.
See cases cited note 30 supra.
47 See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), and Adams v. United States
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), construing the power as subsequently codified
in the Act, and Benson v. State Bd. of Parole, 384 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1967), constru-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964).
48 U.C.M.J. art. 67(a)(4)(b)(1-3), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(4)(b)(1-3) (1964).
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elude original proceedings .in what Congress intended to be only
an appellate tribunal.49
In view of the necessity to preserve the federal courts' power to
determine whether military authorities have exceeded the congres-
sional mandate, 0 and assuming that the Court of Military Appeals
possesses no habeas corpus jurisdiction,51 it does not necessarily
follow that federal courts should always decide military cases in the
first instance or that habeas corpus within the military would not be
desirable in appropriate circumstances. For example, Noyd also
alleged that the degree of restraint imposed upon him at Fort Canon
was more rigorous than required to insure his presence on appeal
and that it constituted a violation of his fifth amendment rights.52
There are at least two elements implicit in this question which mili-
tate against an initial determination by the federal courts. First,
the limitations traditionally placed upon freedom of movement in
the military suggest that the question of reasonable degree of re-
straint is intrinsic to military considerations. 3  Thus, the benefit
of having a military tribunal apply its specialized knowledge of
military requirements to resolve this question prior to its possible
disposition in the federal courts is readily apparent. Secondly, since
the question does not concern whether the military possesses any
power to restrain Noyd, but whether there has been an improper
exercise of power already possessed,54 the policy reasons otherwise
demanding initial determination by federal courts do not weigh as
4 9 That Congress intended the Court of Military Appeals to be an appellate tri-
bunal is suggested not only by its limited jurisdiction (see text accompanying note 48
supra), but also by practical considerations which indicate the inadequacy and incon-
venience of having a three-judge court located in Washington, D.C., consider the multi-
tude of military habeas corpus petitions coming from throughout the land.
5 0 See notes 28-39 supra & accompanying text.
5 1 See notes 40-49 supra & accompanying text.
52 See note 7 supra. The district court, concluding that it had no jurisdiction to in-
quire into this issue apparently followed the idea that applying constitutional rights to
military personnel is not the task of federal courts, but the function of Congress under
its article I powers. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Commandant, 258 F. Supp. 967, 969-70
(D. Kan. 1966), af!'d, 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cit. 1967); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.
MA. 199, 204, 33 C.M.R. 411, 416 (1963). See generally Barker, Military Law -
A Separate System of Jurisprudence, 36 U. CIN. L REV. 223, 224 (1967). It has
been argued, however, that federal courts should apply constitutional rights to the
military. See Katz & Nelson, The Need for Clarification in Military Habeas Corpus,
27 OHIo ST. L.J. 193 (1966); Note, Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE LJ. 380
(1966). For a discussion of the Framers of the Constitution and their intent to apply
the Bill of Rights to the military, see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution:
The Original Understanding, 71 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1957); Wiener, Courts-Martial
and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice II, 72 HARV. L. REv. 266 (1958).
53 Cf. Henderson, supra note 52, at 316.
54 See notes 7 & 9 supra.
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heavily. Therefore, a procedure whereby Noyd could obtain ha-
beas corpus review by the Court of Military Appeals would facili-
tate the ultimate disposition of the case if later brought to the fed-
eral courts. Additionally, military personnel in a predicament
similar to that of Noyd could obtain judicial review within the
military if the Uniform Code of Military justice contained such a
provision.5 5 However, since Congress has not clothed the Court
of Military Appeals with habeas corpus jurisdiction, the valid ex-
ercise of such power could be accomplished only by federal stat-
ute.56
The exhaustion doctrine is a judicial device used to maintain a
viable and efficient military establishment and to circumscribe the
unauthorized exercise of military power. The concept does not
serve its purpose when employed absolutely, in disregard of the
considerations which merit its application. Federal courts through
a discretionary application of the doctrine should grant immedi-
ate review in cases where the military is challenged as having ex-
ceeded its statutory power, thus giving rise to the duty of the fed-
eral courts to check the unauthorized expansion of military power.
On the other hand, they should deny initial review to those peti-
tions alleging merely the defective exercise of authorized military
power, thus requiring the more specialized attention of a military
tribunal in the first instance. The exhaustion doctrine could be
more effectively implemented if the Court of Military Appeals had
habeas corpus jurisdiction. Accordingly, in cases where federal
courts recognize the impropriety of judicial intervention, they
could abstain with the assurance that if later faced with the same
petition they would have the benefit of a military court's expertise.
WILLIAM B. LAWRENCE
55 Cf. note 11 supra.
5 6 At least one writer has suggested that habeas corpus within the military would be
desirable for the purpose of attacking a court-martial conviction. Note, Servicemen
in Civilian Courts, supra note 52, at 403-04.
